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The Tone of Management Forward Looking Statements and                  
Asymmetric Cost Behavior 
 
Abstract 
 
The documentation of asymmetric cost behavior in response to changes in demand has attracted 
much scholarly attention over the past decade. Most studies propose that this cost asymmetry is 
due to the influence of management expectations on their deliberate resource allocation decisions. 
This study examines empirically the effect of management expectations on cost asymmetry, and, 
principally, the tension between these expectation-based decisions and constraints imposed on 
these decisions by two economic drivers of the cost asymmetry— adjustment costs and the initial 
availability of unutilized resources. Using the tone in the forward-looking statements (FLS) of a 
sample of 10-K reports as a measure of management expectations, we document a positive and 
significant relation between the favorableness of management FLS tone and the degree of cost 
stickiness. Furthermore, we demonstrate that managers’ expectation-driven decisions can reverse 
the previously documented anti-sticky cost behavior associated with a high degree of unutilized 
resources. Notably, we find the impact of management expectations on the degree of cost 
asymmetry is strongest when both the degree of unutilized resources and the magnitude of the 
adjustment costs are high. Conversely, when both the magnitude of the adjustment costs and the 
degree of unutilized resources are low, management expectations have no impact on the degree of 
cost asymmetry. Our combined evidence supports the theoretical explanation in the literature that 
management expectations influence their resource allocation decisions, and indicates that other 
economic determinants need to be considered when assessing the impact of these decisions on a 
firm’s cost structure. 
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1. Introduction 
Ever since the influential work of Anderson, Banker and Janakiraman (ABJ) (2003) that 
documented asymmetric cost behavior, researchers have sought to understand the drivers of this 
phenomenon.1 In their study, ABJ find that costs increase, on average, more when current sales 
rise than they decrease when current sales fall by an equivalent amount. They term this cost 
behavior as sticky costs. ABJ conjectured that firms experience these sticky costs because 
managers increase resources when sales rise but make a deliberate decision to maintain unutilized 
resources when they expect a current drop in sales to be temporary. In this way, they seek to 
minimize both current and future adjustment costs. Inspired by these findings, a number of studies 
have documented more generalized forms of the asymmetric cost behavior (e.g., anti-sticky costs; 
Weiss, 2010) and its existence in a variety of different contexts. These studies generally concur 
with the argument that managers’ deliberate decision to adjust resources in response to both sales 
increases and decreases is the primary driver of asymmetric cost behavior (see Banker and 
Byzalov, 2014 for a review of this literature).  
Underlying these managerial resource allocation decisions are expectations regarding 
future demand. These expectation-driven decisions have implications for both current and future 
costs of adjusting resources, such as severance payments, disposal costs of existing equipment, 
training costs, and installation costs of new equipment. However, despite the pivotal role of 
expectations in managers’ resource adjustment decisions, there is no direct empirical evidence of 
how these expectations impact resource allocation choices and, by extension, the direction and 
magnitude of asymmetric cost behavior. The objective of this study is to fill this void in the 
literature by examining the effect of management expectations on cost asymmetry, and, 
                                                            
1 See, for example, Banker and Chen (2006), Kama and Weiss (2013), Cannon (2014), and Noreen and Soderstrom 
(1997) who provide early, small sample, evidence for the existence of cost stickiness in hospitals. 
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principally, the tension between expectation-based resource adjustment decisions and constraints 
imposed on these decisions by the availability of unutilized resources and the cost of adjusting 
resources. Specifically, we first construct a direct measure of management, self-reported, 
expectations and examine the relation between this measure and the sign and magnitude of the cost 
asymmetry. Furthermore, since the literature suggests that management ability to make 
expectation-based resource adjustments is constrained by both resource adjustment costs and the 
degree of unutilized resources carried over the current period, we conduct a detailed analysis of 
the tension between these two constraints and management expectation-driven resource 
adjustment decisions.  
Examining the relation between management expectations and cost asymmetry is 
important because it promotes our understanding of a firm’s cost structure, which, in turn, affects 
earnings. Furthermore, prior literature provides ample evidence for the effect of cost asymmetry 
on a variety of financial variables (e.g., analysts forecasts, modeling future earnings, conservatism, 
accounting fundamentals), which are of interest to internal and external financial statement users. 
To identify management expectations, we construct a measure based on the tone of 
management’s forward-looking statements (FLS) in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
section (MD&A) of 10-K reports. Forward-looking statements are available for a large cross-
section of firms and have been shown to predict both current and future firm performance (e.g., 
Li, 2010a, 2010b; Wang and Hussainey, 2013). 
We begin our analysis by documenting that a favorable tone in a firm’s FLS is positively 
and significantly associated with cost changes related to sales increases and negatively and 
significantly associated with cost changes related to sales decreases. That is, as expectations 
become more optimistic, managers increase costs to a greater extent when sales rise and decrease 
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costs by a lesser extent when sales fall. This finding establishes a positive and significant relation 
between the favorableness of management FLS tone and the degree of cost stickiness and provides 
a validation of our measure of management expectations.  
Our main analysis focuses on the tension between management expectation-driven 
resource adjustment decisions and the constraints imposed on these decisions by the degree of 
unutilized resources carried over the current period. Prior research has found that having fewer 
unutilized resources at the beginning of a period (measured as an increase in prior sales) results in 
sticky cost behavior, whereas a greater degree of unutilized resources (measured as a decrease in 
prior sales) leads to anti-sticky cost behavior (e.g., Kama and Weiss, 2013; Banker et al., 2014). 
Similarly, in our study, we find a positive and significant relation between our measure of 
management expectations and the degree of cost stickiness when there are fewer unutilized 
resources. However, we extend previous findings by documenting that when the degree of 
unutilized resources is high, negative managerial expectations result in anti-sticky cost behavior, 
whereas positive expectations result in sticky cost behavior. Our finding is consistent with our 
hypotheses and demonstrates that expectation-driven decisions, not only attenuate, but actually 
reverse the previously documented anti-sticky cost behavior associated with a high degree of 
unutilized resources. It thus underscores the important role manager decisions play in shaping a 
firm’s cost structure. 
One assumption underlying predictions regarding asymmetric cost behavior is that the 
costs of adjusting resources in response to changes in demand are non-negligible. If adjustment 
costs were negligible (e.g., adjustment costs of direct materials), then costs would be variable and 
management should exhibit a symmetric response to rises and falls in demand. Furthermore, 
negligible costs would mean that management expectations should have little to no impact on cost 
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behavior because there are no current or future adjustment costs that managers need to consider 
when making resource allocation decisions. By contrast, if adjustment costs are non-negligible, 
management expectations should play a more significant role in their resource allocation decisions 
as these decisions impact both current and future adjustment costs. In addition, since managers’ 
discretion in making resource allocation decisions is increasing in the degree of unutilized 
resources, management expectations should play a more significant role when the degree of these 
unutilized resources is higher.2  
Following this discussion, we examine whether the impact of management expectations on 
cost asymmetry varies based on the magnitude of adjustment costs, as well as the degree of 
unutilized resources available at the beginning of the period. Using asset intensity as a measure of 
the magnitude of adjustment costs (e.g., Chen et al., 2012, Banker et al., 2013), we predict and 
find that the impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry is strongest 
when both the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are high. 
Conversely, when the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are 
both low, we find that management expectations have no impact on the degree of cost asymmetry. 
These results are new to the literature and are consistent with the idea that expectations should 
matter most for those managers who are concerned about the costs of resource adjustment and who 
have flexibility due to a greater degree of unutilized resources. By contrast, expectations should 
be less relevant in decision-making when the cost of adjusting resources is low and managers have 
fewer unutilized resources. Together, this evidence supports our prediction that the impact of 
management expectations on resource allocation decisions is contextual. 
                                                            
2 When the degree of unutilized resources available at the beginning of the period is high, managers may use these 
resources in responding to an increase in sales, reducing the need to acquire additional resources. Conversely, when 
managers begin the current period with a low degree of unutilized resources, they have less discretion, and thus will 
need to increase resources almost proportionally in the current period in response to an increase in demand. 
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 In our final analysis, we examine the combined effect of management expectations, the 
degree of unutilized resources, and adjustment costs on the overall sign and magnitude of the cost 
asymmetry. We find the strongest cost stickiness occurs when there is a low degree of unutilized 
resources, a high magnitude of adjustment costs, and management has positive expectations about 
the future. In contrast, we find the strongest cost anti-stickiness occurs when all three drivers 
operate in the opposite direction. Again, these findings are new to the literature and validate the 
individual and incremental roles of each driver in determining firms’ cost structure. 
This study provides several contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a direct 
empirical evidence for the role of management expectations in shaping the cost asymmetry. This 
evidence supports the prevailing theoretical argument in the literature that management 
expectations motivate them to make decisions that impact the firms’ cost structure. Importantly, 
our empirical evidence should not be confused with prior evidence on the moderating effect of 
prior sales changes on asymmetric cost behavior in Banker et al. (2014).3 As discussed in Banker 
at al. (2014) and Banker and Byzalov (2014), this prior evidence likely reflects the combined effect 
of both the degree of unutilized resources available at the beginning of the period and management 
expectations on the cost asymmetry. Using a single measure to capture the combined effect of both 
the degree of initial unutilized resources and management expectations can only shed light on a 
subset of possible cases in which a high degree of initial unutilized resources (prior sales decrease) 
is accompanied by management pessimism, or a low degree of initial unutilized resources (prior 
sales increase) is accompanied by management optimism. Disentangling and separately analyzing 
the distinct and incremental effects of unutilized resources and management expectations on the 
cost asymmetry allows us to examine the existence and magnitude of the cost asymmetry for all 
                                                            
3 Banker et al. (2014) find that when prior sales fall (rise) costs are on average anti-sticky (sticky) in the current period.  
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possible cases including when a high degree of initial unutilized resources (prior sales decrease) is 
accompanied by management optimism (FLS tone is positive), and when a low degree of initial 
unutilized resources (prior sales increase) is accompanied by management pessimism (FLS tone is 
negative). This is important because the latter two cases, which account for 58% of the total 
number of observations in our sample, capture circumstances in which the two economic drivers 
of cost asymmetry operate in an opposite direction, and thus provide an identification of the role 
of each driver.4  
Second, our evidence that the sign of the cost asymmetry (i.e., sticky or anti-sticky) 
depends on whether management expectations are positive or negative, after controlling for a high 
degree of initial unutilized resources, is new to the literature and highlights the importance of 
management expectations in shaping the sign of cost asymmetry. Third, our evidence on the 
combined effect of management expectations, the degree of unutilized resources, and adjustment 
costs on the sign and magnitude of cost asymmetry lends insight to the question of how cost 
asymmetry arises. Specifically, this study is the first to provide empirical evidence that cost anti-
stickiness arises only when both the degree of initial unutilized resources is high and management 
expectations are negative. Having only one of these economic elements is not sufficient to result 
in cost anti-stickiness. This evidence enriches our understanding in how cost anti-stickiness arises. 
Identifying and understanding the building blocks that give rise to the sign of cost asymmetry may 
also benefit future research, since prior studies show that the sign of cost asymmetry affects a 
                                                            
4 Prior sales change and FLS Tone likely capture two distinct drivers of cost asymmetry: the degree of unutilized 
resources and managerial expectations, respectively. This statement is supported by the relatively low correlation 
between prior sales decrease and our measure of FLS tone of -0.09 and by our systematic findings of the individual 
and incremental roles of each driver in determining firms’ cost structure. 
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variety of financial variables as analyst forecasts, modeling future earnings, conservatism, and 
accounting fundamentals. 
Fourth, we provide evidence that the impact of management expectations on the sign and 
magnitude of cost asymmetry depends on both the degree of unutilized resources and the 
magnitude of the adjustment costs. This evidence indicates that other economic determinants need 
to be considered when assessing the relevance of deliberate decisions in resource allocation. 
Finally, we contribute to the emerging body of literature that integrates managerial and financial 
research topics (e.g., Weiss, 2010; Chen et al., 2012; Dierynck et al., 2012; Kama and Weiss, 2013; 
Holzhacker et al., 2015; Banker et al., 2016) by examining the relation between management FLS 
tone in corporate financial reports and internal resource allocation decisions, and by introducing 
textual analysis into managerial accounting research. 
Section 2 develops our hypotheses. We describe the sample and our variable definitions in 
Section 3. Section 4 describes our empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1 The impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry 
Prior studies on cost asymmetry are based on the idea that this asymmetry is driven by 
managerial expectations of future demand. This argument relies on the notion that any increase in 
demand requires management to decide whether and by how much to increase resources. The 
decision of whether to increase resources depends on both the cost of doing so as well as whether 
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management expects high demand to continue.5 When managers expect future demand to remain 
high, they are willing to bear the adjustment costs because the greater resources are likely to be 
needed in the future as well. Accordingly, when sales rise, managers with positive expectations 
are likely to increase resources more aggressively.   
By contrast, when current demand falls, managers must decide whether to cut unutilized 
resources. Again, this decision depends on both the costs of doing so as well as whether 
management expects low demand to continue. When managers expect demand to bounce back in 
the future, they are likely to cut unutilized resources by a lower amount, thereby reducing both 
current and future adjustment costs.6 Thus, managers with positive expectations should hold 
downward their resource adjustments and speed up their upward resource adjustments, resulting 
in a higher degree of cost stickiness. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by testing the following 
prediction: 
H1: The degree of cost stickiness is increasing in the positiveness of management expectations 
 
We note that, while this prediction has been raised in prior studies, it has not been tested 
with a distinct measure of management expectations. Therefore, our empirical tests of this 
prediction are new to the literature and provide further validation of our empirical measure of 
management expectations. 
                                                            
5 The traditional view that variable and fixed costs mechanistically determine the relation between costs and activity 
level implies that adjustment costs are either zero or infinite (Balakrishnan et al., 2014). The revised view in the 
asymmetric cost behavior literature is based on the notion that the drivers of cost behavior are the costs of adjusting 
resources and management deliberate resource allocation decisions. Under this view, significant, but not infinite, 
adjustment costs would result in an asymmetric cost behavior (e.g., Banker and Byzlov, 2014).  
6 The relative impact of management expectations on costs is likely to be stronger when demand rises than when 
demand falls. When demand falls and managers cut unutilized resources, the cost savings resulting from the reduction 
in resources is partly offset by the adjustment costs, such as disposal costs of existing equipment. However, when 
demand rises, increasing resources results in adjustment costs such as installation costs of new equipment which in 
turn intensify the increase in total costs. 
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2.2 The impact of management expectations on cost asymmetry in the presence of constraints 
imposed by the degree of unutilized resources 
Another important driver of the observed variation in cost asymmetry is the degree of 
unutilized resources carried over the current period (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2004; Cannon, 2014). 
Accordingly, we consider the tension between the impact of management expectations and the 
degree of unutilized resources carried over the current period on the variation in cost asymmetry. 
 
High degree of unutilized resources 
A high degree of unutilized resources enables managers to use these resources in 
responding to an increase in sales, thereby reducing the need to acquire additional resources. 
However, when current sales decline, the combination of the existing and the newly created 
unutilized resources may exceed acceptability thresholds, causing managers to reduce these 
resources. Accordingly, managers with a higher degree of unutilized resources would adjust 
resources more quickly when sales fall than when sales rise. While these actions have been shown 
by prior literature to be on average associated with anti-sticky cost behavior (e.g., Balakrishnan et 
al., 2004; Banker et al., 2014), the literature did not examine the distinct and incremental impact 
of management expectations on these actions. 
Cost anti-stickiness associated with a high degree of unutilized resources should be greater 
for managers whose future demand expectations are bleak. When demand increases, such 
managers will be less willing to incur adjustment costs associated with additional resources they 
do not anticipate using in the future. They will also be more aggressive in cutting down unutilized 
resources when demand falls. These managers differ in their decisions from those whose 
expectations are positive. Managers with positive expectations will assume that they can use 
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unutilized resources in the future and will thus be less likely to make aggressive cuts of unutilized 
resources when demand falls and more likely to increase resources beyond the available amount 
when current demand rises. These decisions will reduce the extent of any anti-stickiness and may 
even induce sticky behavior, even when the degree of unutilized resource is high. Accordingly, we 
predict that: 
H2a: Management positive expectations diminish the anti-sticky costs imposed by a high degree 
of unutilized resources 
 
Low degree of unutilized resources 
We next consider the case when managers are faced with a low degree of unutilized 
resources carried over the current period. These managers will need to increase resources almost 
proportionally when demand increases, but can better afford to retain unutilized resources when 
demand falls. As a result, when the degree of unutilized resources is low, managers should exhibit 
slower resource adjustments when demand falls than when demand rises, thereby intensifying the 
extent of cost stickiness (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007; Cannon, 2014). 
We predict that management expectations will impact their resource allocation decisions 
when the degree of unutilized resources is low. Specifically, when managers have positive future 
demand expectations we expect that the degree of cost stickiness will intensify. Managers with 
positive expectations will assume that they can use unutilized resources in the future and will thus 
be less likely to cut unutilized resources when demand falls and are likely to increase resources 
more aggressively when current demand rises. In contrast, managers with negative expectations 
should be more likely to accelerate cost savings when activity levels fall and refrain from adding 
resources when activity levels rise. The former is likely to intensify the degree of cost stickiness, 
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whereas the latter should reduce the degree of cost stickiness (and may induce anti-stickiness). 
Accordingly, we predict that: 
H2b: Management positive expectations intensify the cost stickiness associated with a low degree 
of unutilized resources  
 
2.3 When do management expectations matter the most?  
In our study, we assume that the costs of adjusting resources in response to a change in 
demand are non-negligible. Based on this assumption, we predict that management expectations 
should play a more significant role in their resource allocation decisions when adjustment costs 
are non-negligible.7 We also predict that management expectations should play a more significant 
role when the degree of unutilized resources is high. For example, if demand increases, a manager 
with a high degree of unutilized resources should rely more on her expectations to determine if 
resources beyond those available are necessary. By contrast, a manager with low degree of 
unutilized resources has less discretion in making resource allocation decisions, and therefore will 
not need to rely as heavily on her expectations of future demand.8 Taken together, we predict that 
when adjustment costs are high, management expectations are most relevant in making resource 
allocation decisions; these decisions, in turn, are most influential in determining the cost 
asymmetry when the degree of unutilized resources is high. Combining this argument with the 
discussion in sections 2.1 and 2.2, we hypothesize that:  
                                                            
7 As mentioned above, if adjustment costs were fully negligible, then management would exhibit a symmetric response 
to rises and falls in demand. Furthermore, negligible costs would mean that management expectations should have 
little to no impact on cost behavior because there are no current or future adjustment costs that managers need to 
consider when making resource allocation decisions. 
8 At the extreme, when the degree of unutilized resources is insignificant and current demand rises, a manager cannot 
rely on unutilized resources, and would thus need to meet current demand by acquiring additional resources, regardless 
of her expectations. 
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H3: The impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry is the strongest 
(weakest) when both the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are 
high (low). 
 
The hypotheses above further suggest that the highest degree of cost stickiness (anti-
stickiness) should be observed when management positive (negative) expectations are 
accompanied by a low (high) degree of unutilized resources and a high (low) magnitude of 
adjustment costs. In our subsequent analyses, we empirically test these relations. 
 
3. Sample, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Sample selection 
We obtain our initial sample from the set of all public firms covered by Compustat from 
1994-2014. From this sample, we exclude financial institutions and public utilities (firms with 
four-digit SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999) because these firms and their financial reporting 
requirements are subject to industry-specific regulations. We estimate the yearly inflation rates for 
our sample using monthly inflation data from CRSP U.S. Treasury and Inflation and use these 
rates to adjust the dollar amounts of our variables for inflation.  
After identifying our initial sample, we merge this sample with all 10-K and 10-K405 
(hereafter 10-K) filings covered by the SEC EDGAR online filings website from 1994 to 2014.9 
From this newly-merged sample, we delete any observations with missing data for our estimated 
variables, as well as any observations with non-positive values for sales revenue, SG&A expenses, 
                                                            
9 The SEC mandate for U.S. public companies to file through the EDGAR online system began in 1994. 
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or total assets. Following prior studies, we also exclude any firm-year observations with an SG&A 
expenses-to-sales ratio greater than one. Finally, to limit the effect of extreme observations, we 
rank the firms in our sample according to each of the estimated variables in the regression models 
by year, and remove the extreme 1% of the observations on each side. Our final sample includes 
45,048 firm-year observations. Table 1 provides the details of our sample selection procedure. 
 
3.2 Measuring management expectations  
To measure the favorableness of management expectations, we identify the tone exhibited 
in their forward-looking statements (FLS) included in the Management Discussion and Analysis 
section (MD&A) of the 10-K reports.10 Prior studies have shown that FLS provide a 
comprehensive view of management expectations regarding various aspects of the business that 
ultimately impact future sales. In addition to explicit statements related to sales, these aspects 
include statements related to consumer demand, market conditions, competition, liquidity, 
production, income, pricing, investments, all of which may directly or indirectly impact future 
sales (See Li, 2010a for a complete classification of FLS statements).11,12 
                                                            
10 While management earnings guidance (EG) can also be used as a measure of management expectations, there are 
several limitations associated with this measure: (1) Issuing EG is not a pervasive practice. For example, Hamm et al. 
(2015) document that during 1997-2012 less than 23% of their sample issue EG (see also Ball and Shivakumar, 2008; 
Beyer et al., 2010; Rogers and Van Buskirk, 2013). (2) Prior literature (e.g., Houston et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2011) 
has documented that firms that stop providing EG have poorer prior performance, more uncertain operating 
environments, and fewer informed investors; accordingly, using EG might lead to a biased sample. (3) Managers may 
use their guidance to manage analysts’ earnings expectations (e.g., Cotter et al., 2006; Koh et al., 2008; Kim and Park, 
2012; Ciconte et al., 2014). (4) EG is a quantitative, short term, and is provided at the aggregate level with no reference 
to the components of earnings. 
11 Further validation for the ability of FLS to capture future events is provided in Muslu et al. (2015) who find that 
firms with poor information environments provide a greater quantity of FLS in their MD&As that investors find useful 
in predicting future earnings; and, Bozanic et al. (2015) find evidence that suggests that the forward-looking statements 
in MD&A are positively associated with both market reactions and changes in analyst forecast accuracy. 
12 In a robustness test, we re-run our main tests based on a measure of tone of FLS that contain words that more 
explicitly relate to demand (e.g., “sales,” “revenues,” “pricing”). Our results remain similar to those reported using 
the tone of the entire set of FLS.  
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We extract the MD&A section of each 10-K filing using Perl. The forward-looking 
statements in each MD&A are then identified using a similar dictionary-based approach used in 
prior research (Li 2010a, Bozanic et al. 2015). Specifically, we identify an FLS as any sentence in 
the MD&A which contains one or more forward-looking words and does not contain any word or 
sequence of words which suggest that the sentence pertains to the past or is legal boilerplate. The 
primary purpose of the past exclusion restriction is to eliminate sentences about prior forward-
looking statements which may not be indicative of management’s current expectations of the 
future. Our dictionaries of Forward Looking Words, Exclusion N-Grams, and Legal Exclusion 
Words were constructed using the dictionaries used in Li (2010a) and Bozanic et al. (2015). 
We calculate the tone of each FLS as the difference between the number of positive and 
negative words divided by one, plus the sum of the number of positive and negative words. 
Following prior studies (e.g., Gurun and Butler, 2012; Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012; Huang 
et al., 2014) the numbers of positive and negative words are measured using the financial tone 
dictionaries provided by Loughran and Mcdonald (2011):13 
ܶ݋݊݁௜,௧ ൌ ܲ݋ݏ݅ݐ݅ݒ݁	ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ௜,௧ െ ܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ௜,௧൫1 ൅ ܲ݋ݏݐ݅ݒ݁	ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܰ݁݃ܽݐ݅ݒ݁	ܹ݋ݎ݀ݏ௜.௧൯ 
Since it is possible that management's expectations for year t might affect the tone of FLS included 
in the MD&A for both the end of year t-1 and the end of year t, we calculate the average tone for 
firm i in year t; average Tonei,t = (Tonei,t-1  + Tonei,t)/2.14 After obtaining the average Tone, we 
                                                            
13 For the lists of positive and negative words see http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html. The use of the 
Loughran and Mcdonald (2011) word lists is pervasive in the literature. These lists are based on the word usage in a 
large sample of 10-K reports, which makes them particularly appropriate in the context of our study. As noted in 
Loughran and Mcdonald (2016), applying other dictionaries (such as, Henry, 2008; Harvard’s GI; Diction) that are 
based on other financial disclosures (e.g., earnings press releases, conference calls) to 10-K reports can produce 
spurious results. 
14 We repeat the analysis using the tone at either the beginning or the end of the year (instead of an average) and the 
lagged values of average tone, obtaining similar results. Additionally, results using the abnormal tone measure 
developed by Huang et al. (2014) in the context of earnings press releases are qualitatively the same. As discussed in 
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use a scaled-quintile format to rank all observations according to the value of the average Tone 
and assign each observation to a quintile. We then transform our tone variable into a scaled-quintile 
variable with values ranging from zero to one, following the procedure in Rajgopal et al. (2003) 
and Amir et al. (2015): “0” in the bottom quintile, “0.25” in the second quintile, “0.50” in the third 
quintile, “0.75” in the fourth quintile, and “1” in the highest quintile. We denote this scaled-quintile 
measure of management expectations as EXP.15 
Using the tone of FLS to measure the favorableness of management expectations is 
motivated by recent research examining the relation between management tone in FLS and firms’ 
current and future performance. For example, examining the information content of FLS, Li 
(2010a, 2010b) finds that the tone of forward-looking statements is positively associated with a 
firm’s future performance, consistent with the idea that FLS provide forward looking information 
about the company.16 Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) find that higher levels of pessimistic tone in 
the MD&A section of 10-K reports are related with lower future return on assets, while Feldman 
et al. (2010) find that immediate stock price response is positively associated with changes in 
MD&A tone. A related literature further validates the ability of tone to capture management view 
of the prospects of their business by demonstrating that tone provides a robust measure of the 
information content of other disclosures (e.g., earnings release, newspaper articles, and various 
regulatory filings). For example, Tetlock (2007) finds pessimistic tone in the Wall Street Journal’s 
“Abreast of the Market” column is associated with lower subsequent stock returns and higher stock 
market volatility even when the column does not provide new fundamental information about the 
                                                            
Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012), earnings press releases are subjected to fewer regulations compared to MD&A and 
thus more likely to be used strategically.  
15 Approximately 54% of firm-year observations in out sample change their quintile ranking from year t-1 to year t. 
16 This finding suggests that management expectations, as reflected in the FLS Tone, are on average, unbiased. 
However, even if these expectations are partially based on psychological bias (in addition to available information), 
all of our hypotheses and inferences will remain the same (see Banker et al., 2014, footnote 17). 
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stock. Tetlock et al. (2008) document a greater frequency of negative words in the Wall Street 
Journal and Dow Jones News Service stories is associated with lower subsequent earnings. 
Similarly, Kothari et al. (2009) provide evidence that positive tone of disclosures by the firm, 
analysts, or the media is negatively related with volatility and forecast dispersion. Davis et al. 
(2012) find that managers use both optimistic and pessimistic tone in their earnings press releases 
as a way to provide investors with information about expected future performance of their firms. 
Finally, Price et al. (2012) find the extent of positive tone in the Q&A portion of the conference 
call is associated with a positive return in a three-day and two-month windows.17  
Overall, an overwhelming number of studies that employs word lists to capture 
management tone in a large variety of research contexts provide ample validation for the ability of 
these word lists and their associated tone measures to explain and predict various economic 
outcomes. Accordingly, our empirical measure of management expectations provides a more 
explicit identification of the role of these expectations in determining the sign and magnitude of 
cost asymmetry, distinctly from and incrementally to the degree of unutilized resources.18 As 
discussed above, this claim is further supported by the relatively low correlation between prior 
sales decrease and our measure of FLS tone of -0.09. As an additional supportive evidence of the 
distinct nature of the FLS tone relative to prior sales change, we report in panel B of Table 2 the 
frequency of observations by the sign of prior sales change and quintiles of FLS Tone. The results 
indicate that the frequency of observations associated with the lowest (most negative) tone quintile 
and increase in prior sales is 18%, and those associated with of the highest (most positive) tone 
                                                            
17 As discussed in the comprehensive reviews of this nascent literature by Li (2010b) and Lougharn and McDonald 
(2016), many additional studies have used word-lists to gauge tone in a variety of other contexts. 
18 Unlike prior sales change used in Banker et al. (2014) to empirically proxy for the combined effect of the degree of 
unutilized resources and management expectations, 
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quintile and decrease in prior sales is 16% (these are the two cases that cannot be captured by the 
measure used in Banker et al. 2014). These frequencies are close to the expected frequency of 
20%, and, importantly, are significantly and economically greater than zero, which is the frequency 
expected if prior sales changes capture completely management expectations. These statistics 
combined with the empirical findings reported below supports the distinct and incremental nature 
of FLS tone relative to prior sales change used by Banker et al. (2014) as a combined measure of 
the degree of unutilized resources and managerial expectations. 
 
3.3 Variable definitions  
The dependent variable in our regression models is the log change of SG&A expenses 
(SGA) for firm i in year t (ΔlnSGAi,t); ΔlnSGAi,t = log (SGAi,t / SGAi,t-1). Consistent with the 
literature we focus on SGA to capture managerial choices affecting the costs of providing services, 
marketing and distribution, and other administrative overhead costs. Other key variables are sales 
revenue (REV), the log change of sales revenue [ΔlnREVi,t = log (REVi,t / REVi,t-1)], and an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if REVit<REVi,t-1 and 0 otherwise (REVDECit). Following previous 
studies (e.g., Banker et al., 2014), we use prior sales change to measure the degree of unutilized 
resources available at the beginning of the period. Specifically, if managers faced a sales increase 
in the past, they may have drawn on unutilized resources to meet demand, leading to a lower degree 
of unutilized resources available for the current period. We define LowUnutilizedResourcesi,t as 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if REVi in year t-1 is higher than in year t-2 and 0 otherwise.19 
This measure builds on the notion that when prior sales have risen, managers are more likely to 
                                                            
19 By including in our regressions prior change in sales and the tone of FLS as proxies for the degree of unutilized 
resources and management expectations, respectively, we are able to assess the incremental and distinct effect of each 
driver on the cost asymmetry while controlling for the effect of the other driver. 
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have exhausted existing resources, resulting in lower amount of unutilized resources at the 
beginning of the current period relative to when prior sales decreases. Conversely, when prior sales 
decreases, managers likely retained some of the resources resulting in a greater amount of 
unutilized resources carried over to the current period, relative to when prior sales increase (e.g., 
Cannon, 2014).20 
Finally, previous studies argue that adjustment costs are higher for firms whose sales 
require a higher amount of assets, as there is lower flexibility in changing the amount of assets.21 
Consequently, we use asset intensity, measured as the log of the ratio of total assets to sales 
revenues, to determine adjustment costs, ASINTi,t = log (Assetsi,t / REVi,t). 
  
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. 
Consistent with prior studies, we find that the respective distributions of REV and SGA are skewed 
to the right as their mean values (REV = $2,239 million; SGA = $377 million) are larger than their 
median values (REV = $249 million; SGA = $53 million). We also find that the ratio between 
SGA and REV (mean = 0.28) and the log change of both REV and SGA (mean = 0.06) are similar 
                                                            
20 As robustness, we estimated our main regressions using two alternative measures of unutilized resources. The first 
one defines observations as a high degree of unutilized resources when REV in year t-1 is lower than in year t-2 and 
the change in the prior SG&A (i.e., SGA t-1/SGA t-2) is greater than or equal to the change in prior sales (i.e., REVt-
1/REV t-2), and a low degree of unutilized resources otherwise. The second one defines observations as a high degree 
of unutilized resources when REV in year t-1 is lower than in year t-2 and the prior change in the number of employees 
is greater than or equal to the change in prior sales, and a low degree of unutilized resources otherwise. While not 
common in the literature, these measures might be able to better identify firm-year observations associated with a high 
degree of unutilized resources at the beginning of the period as those that experienced a decrease in sales that was not 
accompanied by a proportional decrease in capacity. Results using these alternative measures remain similar to those 
reported in tables 4-6.  
21 Some studies use employee intensity as an additional measure of adjustment costs. However, Kama and Weiss 
(2013) indicate that the coefficient estimate of employee intensity is insignificant for large firms. Furthermore, Chen 
et al. (2012) show that the sign and significance level of employee intensity is not stable over time, presumably due 
to the use of temporary labor to a greater extent in recent years. Our results are statistically indistinguishable when we 
add employee intensity as an additional control variable. 
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to those documented in prior studies. In addition, our sales decline frequency of 36% is similar to 
the 37% found in Banker et al. (2014). Finally, our median Tone of -0.21 is equal to that 
documented in Li (2010a). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry 
 
We test the impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry (H1) by 
estimating the following regression model22: 
   
.εlnREVDEC ASINT
lnREVDECγβlnγβγβln
ititit1
it22it11it00


it
itititit
REV
REVEXPREVEXPEXPSGA
  (1) 
Table 3, Column (1) reports the results from replicating the ABJ basic model. Consistent 
with previous studies, we find that the coefficient estimate on 1 is 0.667 and significant, while 
that of 2 is -0.263 and significant. These results suggest that a one percent increase in sales results 
in a 66.7 basis points (bps) increase in SG&A expenses, while a one percent decrease in sales 
results in a (66.7 - 26.3 =) 40.4 bps decrease in SG&A expenses. The difference between these, 
2, captures the degree of cost stickiness. 
The results in Column (2) show a negative and significant coefficient for 2, the interaction 
between EXP and REVDEC*ΔlnREV. This coefficient indicates that when management has the 
most negative expectations (the lowest quintile of EXP), the degree of cost stickiness, 2, is -0.183, 
negative and significant. However, when management has the most positive expectations (the 
                                                            
22 In estimating all our regression models, we cluster observations by firm and year to provide standard errors that are 
robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, as suggested by Petersen (2009). 
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highest quintile of EXP), the degree of cost stickiness significantly intensifies by 0.167 to -0.350. 
This finding provides support to our prediction that the degree of cost stickiness increase in the 
positiveness of management expectations.  
Column (3) presents the results of our analyses after controlling for the level of asset 
intensity (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Banker et al., 2013). These results show that a one percent 
increase in current sales results in an incremental increase in SG&A expenses of 15.7 bps (γ1) 
when managers have the most positive expectations compared to when they have the most negative 
expectations. Conversely, the results show that when sales fall, management expectations attenuate 
the reduction in expenses by 6.4 bps (1 + 2 = 0.157 – 0.221 = -0.064, significant at the 0.01 level). 
To further validate the results in Table 3, we examine whether the impact of expectations 
on cost asymmetry is pervasive throughout its distribution. To do so, we estimate the ABJ 
benchmark model within our EXP quintiles and depict the coefficient estimates for 1 and 2 in 
Figure 1. From Figure 1, we see that both 1 and 2 are monotonically associated with management 
expectations. Specifically, 1 increases monotonically from 0.585 in the lowest EXP quintile to 
0.741 in the highest EXP quintile. Furthermore, 2, the measure of sticky costs, decreases 
monotonically from -0.168 in the lowest EXP quintile to -0.339 in the highest EXP quintile. The 
differences in 1 and 2 between these quintiles are both economically and statistically significant. 
The finding that 2 is negative and significant in the most pessimistic tone quintile is inconsistent 
with the assertion in the literature that negative expectations might lead to cost anti-stickiness. 
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 provides an initial direct support 
for the role managers’ expectations play in shaping a firm’s cost structure, and a validation of our 
measure of management expectations. 
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4.2 The impact of management expectations on cost asymmetry in the presence of 
constraints imposed by the degree of unutilized resources 
We next examine the results of estimating regression model (1) for sub-samples of high 
and low degrees of unutilized resources (LowUnutilizedResourcesi,t = 0 or 1, respectively). The 
results in Panel A of Table 4 show a negative and significant coefficient estimate for 2, our 
measure of the impact of management expectations on cost asymmetry, regardless of the degree 
of unutilized resources.   
Using the coefficient estimates in Panel A, Panel B reports the level of cost asymmetry 
according to the degree of unutilized resources and management expectations. The results in Panel 
B indicate that the degree of cost anti-stickiness associated with a high degree of unutilized 
resources is 0.116 when managers have the most negative expectations. Consistent with H2a, the 
degree of anti-stickiness significantly diminishes by 0.233 when managers have the most positive 
expectations, leading to a significant cost stickiness of -0.117. Also, consistent with H2b, when 
the degree of unutilized resources is low, we find that the degree of cost stickiness is -0.301 when 
managers have the most negative expectations, intensifying to -0.447 when managers have the 
most positive expectations (the mean ASINT for the subsamples of high and low degrees of 
unutilized resources are equal to 0.12 and 0.22, respectively).23  
Overall, we conclude that the findings in Table 4 support our second hypothesis. 
Furthermore, they show that managers’ expectation-driven decisions can not only eliminate but 
also cause a reversal in the anti-sticky cost behavior imposed by a high degree of unutilized 
                                                            
23 These results are quantitatively similar when using the two alternative measures of unutilized resources described 
in footnote 20.  
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resources, again underscoring the importance of managers’ deliberate decisions in shaping a 
firm’s cost structure. 
 
4.3 When do management expectations matter the most?  
We next test the joint impact of the degree of unutilized resources and the magnitude of 
adjustment costs on the relation between management expectations and cost asymmetry (H3) by 
estimating the following regression model: 
 
 
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Column (1) of Table 5 reports the results of estimating this regression model for the full 
sample. Consistent with the results reported in Table 4, the findings in Column (1) show that the 
impact of management expectations on cost asymmetry is significant for both high and low degrees 
of unutilized resources. Specifically, the impact of management expectations on cost asymmetry 
when the degree of unutilized resources is high is -0.227 (γ2), and is significantly lower by 0.107 
(ν2) when it is low.24  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 present the results for our sub-samples of high and low 
magnitude of adjustment costs (ASINT above and below the median, respectively). Consistent with 
H3, we find that the impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry is 
strongest when both the magnitude of the adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources 
                                                            
24 The combined effect for a low degree of unutilized resources is γ2 + ν2 = -0.120, significantly different from zero at 
the 0.01 level.  
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are high (γ2 in Column 2 is equal to -0.330, p-value < 0.01).25 However, when both the magnitude 
of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are low, management expectations 
appear to have no impact on the cost asymmetry; γ2 + ν2 in Column 3 is equal to (-0.104 + 0.076 
=) -0.028, p-value of 0.6. These results are striking and illustrate that an analysis of the role of 
management expectations in making resource allocation decisions should consider the effects on 
these decisions of other economic drivers of a firm’s cost structure. 
 
4.4 The combined effect of unutilized resources, adjustment costs, and management 
expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry  
 Thus far, we documented the impact of management expectations on the cost asymmetry 
in the presence of unutilized resources and adjustment costs. In this subsection, we examine the 
combined impact of these three constructs on the overall sign and magnitude of the cost 
asymmetry. We rely on the coefficient estimates from Table 5 and report the results of this analysis 
in Table 6. 
Table 6 shows that when the degree of unutilized resources is high, costs are either anti-
sticky or sticky. Specifically, cost asymmetry ranges from a value of 0.253 (p-value < 0.01) to a 
value of -0.135 (p-value = 0.02). Conversely, costs are sticky when there is a low degree of 
unutilized resources, regardless of either adjustment costs or management expectations. 
Furthermore, we find the highest degree of cost anti-stickiness, 0.253, occurs when there is a high 
degree of unutilized resources, a low magnitude of adjustment costs, and management with 
                                                            
25 The value of γ2 associated with a high magnitude of adjustment costs (-0.330) is significantly more negative than: 
(1) the value of γ2 associated with a low magnitude of adjustment costs (-0.104; the difference between -0.330 and       
-0.104 is significant at the 0.01 level), and (2) the value of γ2 + ν2 associated with high magnitude of adjustment costs; 
(-0.330+0.171=) -0.159, the difference between -0.330 and -0.159 is significant at the 0.06 level. 
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negative expectations. In contrast, we find the highest cost stickiness, -0.538, occurs when all three 
drivers operate to intensify cost stickiness, i.e., a low degree of unutilized resources, a high 
magnitude of adjustment costs, and management with positive expectations. Together, the results 
in this table validate the individual and incremental roles of each driver in determining a firm’s 
cost structure. 
 
4.5 Robustness tests 
We test for the robustness of our main results by performing the following analyses 
(untabulated for brevity). First, we re-run our regressions using six alternative tone measures: FLS 
Tone above (below) the median as a measure for management with positive (negative) 
expectations; Positive (negative) FLS Tone as a measure for management with positive (negative) 
expectations; FLS Tone transformed into a scaled-decile variable; FLS tone as a continuous 
variable; lagged values of FLS tone; additionally, Loughran and Mcdonald (2016) raise a concern 
regarding the existence of negation surrounding positive or negative words which may lead to tone 
misclassification. In an additional analysis, we identify instances in which any of the three words 
preceding positive and negative words are a negation word (e.g., “not”) and adjust the tone 
accordingly (4.6% percent of the sample). Second, to control for the potential effects of other 
economic variables on the cost asymmetry, we re-run our analyses including interactive terms 
between the degree of cost asymmetry (measured as REVDEC*ΔlnREV) and both the real change 
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the log change in order backlog.26 Additionally, we 
replicate the results after controlling for the degree of financial risk (measured as whether the ratio 
                                                            
26 We find that incremental to EXP, the degree of cost stickiness is increasing in the real change in GDP but is unrelated 
to the change in order backlog. Similar to prior studies, order backlog is available for only 25% of the sample. 
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of debt to assets is above or below the sample median). Third, our results are robust to the inclusion 
of the number of FLS sentences (Muslu et al., 2015), a measure of business complexity (the 
number of business segments), and two alternative measures of the degree of unutilized resources 
(see footnote 20). Fourth, Chen et al. (2012) find that the degree of cost stickiness increases for 
empire-building managers. We replicate our results after controlling for impact of the level of 
scaled free cash flow on the cost asymmetry (as in Chen et al., 2012). Fifth, we run a fully 
interactive model including all explanatory variables as stand-alone variables as well as all 
interactions between the explanatory variables (i.e., ΔlnREV, REVDEC, EXP, 
LowUnutilizedResources, and ASINT). Sixth, to ensure that our findings are not driven by industry-
specific characteristics, we control for potential industry-specific effects using the Fama-French 
industry classification to identify industries for the firms in our sample. Finally, we run our 
regressions for manufacturing (Fama-French industry portfolio number 3 of 12) and non-
manufacturing sub-samples. Our various results regarding the relation between the tone of FLS 
and cost asymmetry, for all of these robustness tests, remain qualitatively similar to those reported 
in our main analyses. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The asymmetric cost response to changes in demand has attracted much attention over the 
past decade. In this study, we provide direct empirical evidence in support of the role of 
management expectations in shaping asymmetric cost behavior. Using FLS tone as a measure of 
management expectations, we find a positive and significant relation between the favorableness of 
management FLS tone and the degree of cost stickiness. Furthermore, we find that when the degree 
of unutilized resources is high, negative expectations result in anti-stickiness, whereas positive 
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expectations lead to a sticky cost behavior. Accordingly, management expectations can reverse the 
anti-sticky cost behavior imposed by a high degree of unutilized resources, underscoring the 
importance of managers’ deliberate decisions in shaping a firm’s cost structure. We also find that 
the impact of management expectations on the degree of cost asymmetry is strongest when both 
the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are high. Conversely, 
when both the magnitude of adjustment costs and the degree of unutilized resources are low, 
management expectations have no impact on the degree of cost asymmetry. Finally, we find the 
highest degree of cost stickiness occurs when there is a low degree of unutilized resources, a high 
magnitude of adjustment costs, and management with positive expectations. In contrast, the 
highest cost anti-stickiness occurs when all three drivers operate in the opposite direction.  
Our results provide several implications for further study. First, our findings of differential 
effects of management expectations depending on the level of unutilized resources and the cost of 
resource adjustments suggest that other economic determinants need to be considered when 
assessing the relevance of deliberate decisions in resource allocation. Second, we have examined 
one feature of financial reporting in our study. Future work could explore additional features of 
financial reporting to gain further insight into how managerial internal resource allocation 
decisions are made as well as the implications of those decisions for a firm’s cost structure.  
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FIGURE 1 
Management expectations and the degree of cost asymmetry 
 
The figure presents regression results for subsamples formed based on the tone of FLS (each subsample includes, on average, 9,390 observations). 
First, we rank all firm-year observations according to the value of FLS tone and assign them into quintiles. Then, we estimate the following ABJ 
benchmark model within each quintile and depict the coefficient estimates of 1 and 2:  
itit210 εlnREVDEClnβln  ititit REVREVSGA   
0.585
0.625
0.658
0.689
0.741
0.55
0.65
0.75
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
FLS Tone Quintile
β1
‐0.168
‐0.244
‐0.253
‐0.299
‐0.339‐0.35
‐0.25
‐0.15
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
FLS Tone Quintile
β2
Observations
Initial sample: Firm-year observations available on Compustat, 1994 - 2014 238,801
Excluding financial institutions and public utilities (35,524)
(1) Compustat sample 203,277
(2) 10-K MD&A, SEC EDGAR online filing, 1994 - 2014 118,752
Number of observations after merging (1) and (2) 76,212
Excluding observations without valid data (31,164)
Full sample 45,048
TABLE 1
Sample Selection
Note: The initial sample includes all public firms covered by Compustat. We exclude financial
institutions and public utilities (4-digit SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999). In the second
step we include all 10-K filings covered by the SEC EDGAR online filings website and merge
the data with the data obtained from Compustat in the first step. We then delete observations
without valid data on the estimated variables, as well as firm-year observations with SG&A
expenses-to-sales ratio higher than one, and the extreme 1% of the estimated variables in the
regression models.
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl
REV 2,239.0 11,998 70.3 248.5 992.6
SGA 376.7 1,899 17.5 52.5 181.9
ΔlnREV 0.06 0.25 -0.05 0.05 0.16
ΔlnSGA 0.06 0.21 -0.04 0.05 0.15
SGA/ REV 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.38
ASINT 0.18 0.87 -0.37 0.03 0.54
REVDEC 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00
FLS Tone -0.19 0.23 -0.35 -0.21 -0.05
EXP 0.48 0.35 0.25 0.50 0.75
Most negative 
tone Q2 Q3 Q4
Most positive 
tone
20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
24% 22% 21% 18% 16%
Prior sales increase 18% 19% 20% 21% 22%
Prior sales decrease
Panel B: Frequency of observations by the sign of prior sales change and quintiles of 
FLS Tone
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample
Note: Revit  is the annual sales revenue of firm i in year t (in millions of dollars);
SGAit is annual SG&A expenses (in millions of dollars); ΔlnREVit is the log
change of sales revenue [ΔlnREVi,t = log (REVi,t / REVi,t-1)]; ΔlnSGAit is the log
change of SGA [ΔlnSGAi,t = log (SGAi,t / SGAi,t-1)]; ASINTit is the log ratio of
assets to REV [ASINTi,t = log (Assetsi,t / REVi,t)]; REVDECit is an indicator
variable that equals 1 if  REVit<REVi,t-1 and  0 otherwise; FLS Tone is the tone of
management forward-looking statements (FLS) included in the Management
Discussion and Analysis section (MD&A) of 10-K reports; EXP is the Tone
variable transformed into a scaled-quintile format with values ranging from 0 to 1.
The number of observations is equal to 45,048. 
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Coefficient Description (1) (2) (3)
Benchmark Model
1 Sales Increase 0.667*** 0.589*** 0.583***
(21.06) (18.97) (18.86)
2 Cost Asymmetry -0.263*** -0.183*** -0.108***
(-6.26) (-4.05) (-2.66)
1 Sales Increase 0.153*** 0.157***
(5.40) (5.56)
2 Cost Asymmetry -0.167*** -0.221***
(-5.30) (-7.68)
1 Asset Intensity -0.158***
(-13.32)
Intercepts
0 0.008** 0.001 0.003
(2.19) (0.17) (0.57)
0 Management Expectations 0.013** 0.012**
(2.36) (2.04)
Adj-R2 0.442 0.446 0.455
N 45,048 45,048 45,048
TABLE 3
The Impact of Management Expectations on Cost Asymmetry
The Impact of Management Expectations
 Notes:  
1. The table presents the coefficients and the associated t-statistics (in parentheses)
for the following regression model:     
ti,,ti,ti,1
,ti,,22,ti,11ti,00,
εlnREVDEC ASINT
lnREVDECγβlnγβγβln


ti
titititi
REV
REVEXPREVEXPEXPSGA
    (1) 
2. See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
3. *, **, *** - Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.  
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Panel A - Regression Results
Coefficient Description High Low
(1) (2)
1 0.406*** 0.629***
(20.30) (17.78)
2 0.134*** -0.274***
(4.26) (-5.42)
The Impact of Management Expectations
1 Sales Increase 0.174*** 0.123***
(5.27) (3.50)
2 Cost Asymmetry -0.233*** -0.146***
(-4.24) (-3.68)
1 Asset Intensity -0.151*** -0.125***
(-12.32) (-6.23)
Intercepts
0 -0.021*** 0.019***
(-4.09) (3.27)
0 Management Expectations 0.016** 0.005
(2.17) (0.74)
Adj-R2 0.369 0.469
N 14,861 30,187
Panel B - The Degree of Cost Asymmetry 
High Low
Negative Expectations (EXP = 0) 2 + 1 * ASINT 0.116*** -0.301***
The Effect of Positive Expectations 2 -0.233*** -0.146***
Positive Expectations (EXP = 1) 2 + 2  + 1 * ASINT  -0.117*** -0.447***
TABLE 4
The Impact of Management Expectations on Cost Behavior in the Presence of High versus 
Low Degree of Unutilized Resources
Unutilized Resources
Benchmark Model
Unutilized Resources
Notes:  
1. Panel A presents the regression results for the sub-samples of a high degree of
unutilized resources (prior sales decrease) and a low degree of unutilized resources
(prior sales increase). Specifically, it presents the coefficients and associated t-
statistics (in parentheses) for the following regression model:    
ti,,ti,ti,1
,ti,,22,ti,11ti,00,
εlnREVDEC ASINT
lnREVDECγβlnγβγβln


ti
titititi
REV
REVEXPREVEXPEXPSGA
    (1) 
2. Using the coefficient estimates in Panel A, Panel B quantifies the degree of cost
asymmetry according to the degree of unutilized resources and management 
expectations.  
3. See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
4. *, **, *** - Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.  
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Coefficient Description All High Low
(1) (2) (3)
1 0.344*** 0.319*** 0.376***
(18.60) (12.69) (11.45)
1 EXP 0.174*** 0.219*** 0.119**
(5.25) (5.97) (2.53)
λ1 Low Unutilized Resources 0.325*** 0.312*** 0.355***
(12.01) (7.79) (9.68)
ν1 EXP*Low Unutilized Resources -0.071* -0.087* -0.074
(-1.86) (-1.83) (-1.38)
2 0.255*** 0.312*** 0.230***
(8.63) (7.33) (5.05)
2 EXP -0.227*** -0.330*** -0.104**
(-4.71) (-4.62) (-2.03)
λ2 Low Unutilized Resources -0.599*** -0.584*** -0.650***
(-19.10) (-11.93) (-12.13)
ν2 EXP*Low Unutilized Resources 0.107** 0.171* 0.076
(2.04) (1.89) (1.04)
1 Asset Intensity -0.136*** -0.141*** -0.051**
(-13.71) (-9.62) (-1.96)
Intercepts
0 0.003 0.017*** -0.012**
(0.69) (2.66) (-2.33)
0 Tone 0.012** 0.004 0.025***
(2.18) (0.57) (4.70)
Adj-R2 0.476 0.448 0.506
N 45,048 22,526 22,522
The Incremental Effect on Cost Asymmetry of:
The Incremental Effect on Sales Increase of:
Adjustment Costs
TABLE 5
The Relative Importance of Management Expectations
Notes:  
1. The table presents the regression results for the full sample, as well as for the sub-samples of a
high magnitude of adjustment costs (ASINT above the median) and a low magnitude of
adjustment costs (ASINT below the median). Specifically, it presents the coefficients and
associated t-statistics (in parentheses) for the following regression model: 
 
 
,REVREVDEC ASINT
REVlREVDECsourceszedLowUnutiliEXPsourceszedLowUnutiliEXPγβ
REVsourceszedLowUnutiliEXPsourceszedLowUnutiliEXPγβEXPγβSGA
ittiitti,
tiititit22
tiititit11it00ti






,1
,22
,11,
ln
lnReRe
lnReReln   (2) 
2. LowUnutilizedResources,t, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if REVi in year t-1 is higher
than in year t-2 and 0 otherwise. See Table 2 for definitions of other variables.  
3. *, **, *** - Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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The Degree of Cost Asymmetry High Low
Negative Expectations (EXP = 0) 2 + 1 * ASINT 0.195*** 0.253***
Positive  Expectations (EXP =1) 2 + 2 + 1 * ASINT -0.135** 0.149***
Negative Expectations (EXP = 0) 2 + λ2 +  1 * ASINT -0.388*** -0.397***
Positive  Expectations (EXP = 1) 2 + λ2 + 2 + ν2 + 1 * ASINT -0.538*** -0.424***
TABLE 6
The Combined Effect of Unutilized Resources, Adjustment Costs and Management 
Expectations on the Degree of Cost Asymmetry
Adjustment Costs
High Degree of Unutilized Resources 
Low Degree of Unutilized Resources 
Notes:  
1. The table presents an interpretation of the results reported for regression 2 in Table 
5. Using the coefficient estimates in Table 5, Table 6 reports the degree of cost 
asymmetry according to the degree of unutilized resources, magnitude of 
adjustment costs, and management expectations.  
2. See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
3. *, **, *** - Significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively.  
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